Wage rates in the seven leading southern states of Auto Alley-Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee-have been one-sixth lower than those in the five Midwest states of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The median hourly wage for all manufacturing workers in 2006 was $12.31 in the South compared to $14.24 in the Midwest.
Similarly, the South has had a lower unionization rate. The five Midwest states had 3.4 million workers represented by a union in 2006, or 16.7 percent of all salaried and hourly workers in the region (excluding self-employed workers). In Michigan, 20.4 percent of the workforce was unionized. The states in the portion of Auto Alley lying south of the Ohio River had 1.1 million unionized workers in 2006, representing only 6.6 percent of the total workforce.
The opportunity to move south within Auto Alley has been provided by the structural changes that the motor vehicle industry has undergone. As responsibility has shifted from carmakers to suppliers, and as market share has shifted from the Detroit 3 to foreign-owned carmakers, production has shifted from higher wage unionized plants in the Midwest to lower wage nonunion plants in the South.
Outsourcing by carmakers has been most responsible for lower rates of pay and union membership. The final assembly plants and powertrain and stamping plants operated by the carmakers have had wage rates nearly twice as high as the parts plants owned by independent suppliers. Two-thirds of the workers at carmakers were union members in 2007, compared to less than one-fifth at suppliers.
Market shifts also have had an impact on wage rates because labor costs have been lower at foreign-owned carmakers than at the Detroit 3. In 2007, hourly labor costs, including wages, benefits, and pension obligations, were about $72 at the Detroit 3, compared to about $45 to $50 at Japanese-owned carmakers (Barkholtz 2007b) . The impact of foreign-owned carmakers has been even greater on union membership because all foreign-owned assembly plants (with the exception of joint ventures with the Detroit 3) have been nonunion, and union membership rates have been much lower at foreign-owned suppliers than at U.S.-owned ones.
As a result of the shifts, parts once made by union members earning $70 an hour in wages and benefits at Detroit 3 facilities-most of which are in the Midwest-have been turned over to nonunion suppli-ers-increasingly located in the South-paying $20 an hour in wages and benefits.
RISE AND FALL OF AUTO UNIONS
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. motor vehicle industry employed approximately 751,000 production workers in 2006 . Approximately 162,000 of these production workers were employed at assembly plants (NAICS Code 33611) and 589,000 at parts plants (NAICS codes 336211 and 3363).
Our database of several thousand plants showed that, in 2006, 34.5 percent of employees at supplier plants had union representation and 65.5 percent did not. Applying these percentages to the total number of production workers, an estimated 203,000 workers at supplier plants belonged to a union and 386,000 did not.
A somewhat more precise count can be made of union workers at assembly plants. In 2006, approximately 122,000 production workers at assembly plants belonged to a union and 40,000 did not. Combining the figures for assembly plants and suppliers, we estimate that a total of 325,000 production workers (43.3 percent) belonged to a union in 2006 and 426,000 (56.7 percent) did not.
Profile of Union Decline
The principal auto-related union in the United States since 1937 has been the United Auto Workers (UAW), officially the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. At parts suppliers (excluding Detroit 3 facilities), though, other unions combined have represented more workers than the UAW.
UAW
The UAW had 538,446 members in 2006, according to the union's 2007 annual report. The "real" number at the time may have been as low as 500,000 and as high as 576,131 according to UAW officials. 2 There was no uncertainty concerning the precipitous decline in UAW membership. From its peak of 1.5 million in 1979, the union lost two-thirds of its members in three decades. And there is no end in sight in the early twenty-first century. The decline has been steady and continuous: 1,150,000 members in 1985, 850,000 in 1990, 750,000 in 1995, 650,000 in 2000, and 550,000 in 2005 (Figure 12.1) .
We estimate that about 251,000 UAW members held production jobs in the motor vehicle industry in 2006. The other UAW members worked in aerospace and agricultural equipment factories, as recognized in the union's full name, as well as in casinos, hospitals, legal services, local government, and universities. UAW members also worked in nonproduction jobs in the motor vehicle industry, as well as for manufacturers of medium-and heavy-duty trucks that have not been included in this book. The 251,000 UAW members in the motor vehicle production jobs in 2006 included approximately 120,000 in final assembly plants and 131,000 in parts plants. The UAW represented production workers at every assembly plant operated by the Detroit 3, with one exception-GM's Moraine, Ohio, assembly plant-which recognized the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers-Communications Workers of America (IUE-CWA). The IUE presence at Moraine was a legacy of the plant's original purpose of making refrigerators for Frigidaire, which GM owned until 1979. The UAW also represented workers at three foreign-run assembly plants: AutoAlliance in Flat Rock, Michigan; Mitsubishi in Normal, Illinois; and NUMMI in Fremont, California. All three plants were originally established as joint ventures between Japanese and U.S. companies, Ford and Mazda at Flat Rock, Chrysler and Mitsubishi in Illinois, and GM and Toyota in California. Inclusion of the union was part of the joint-venture agreements.
The 131,000 parts workers represented by the UAW could be divided into two groups: about 67,000 in parts plants owned by the Detroit 3 and 64,000 in plants owned by suppliers.
UAW membership was heavily clustered in the Midwest portion of Auto Alley. The Midwest had one-half of all automotive parts workers in the United States, compared with two-thirds of all unionized parts workers and four-fifths of all UAW parts workers. Michigan, with onefifth of all parts workers, had one-half of all UAW members. The southern portion of Auto Alley, on the other hand, with one-fourth of all parts workers, had only one-eighth of all unionized parts workers and onefourteenth of all UAW parts workers.
Other auto industry unions
An estimated 72,000 parts workers belonged to a union other than the UAW in 2006. Roughly half of them were in the USW, a union that is derived from the United Steelworkers of America. The USW evolved from its steel-industry origins through numerous mergers. Most USW members in the motor vehicle industry arrived through a 1995 merger with the United Rubber Workers (URW), which had organized the tire factories. The second-largest group of USW members came through a 2004 merger with the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE).
The third-largest auto-related union has been the IUE-CWA, which represented about 15,000 auto industry workers in 2006. Half were in former GM factories, especially in the Dayton area, that had been turned over to Delphi in 1999. As noted above, these factories originally produced electrical products, such as refrigerators and air conditioners. Two other unions with roughly 10,000 auto workers each in 2006 were the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE). With the exception of the cluster of IUE-CWA plants in the Dayton area, the pattern of representation of the various unions has been a result of the happenstance of local events.
Foreign-owned suppliers: Unions not welcome
The flip side of declining market share for the Detroit 3 and their suppliers has been an increasing market share for foreign-owned companies and their suppliers. As a result, unions lose in two ways: the Detroit 3 and their suppliers have cut union jobs, while foreign-owned companies and their suppliers have added nonunion jobs.
Union representation has been extremely low among foreign-owned suppliers in the United States. Roughly 15,000 of the 125,000 employees of Japanese-owned supplier plants belonged to a union in 2006, including only about 5,000 in the UAW. The two largest Japanese-owned suppliers in North America-Denso and Yazaki-had no union. At the largest German-owned supplier-Robert Bosch-only 7 percent of production workers were unionized.
Unions and companies agree that foreign-owned plants do not provide an environment conducive for collective bargaining, but they would describe the environment differently. The companies see an environment in which collective bargaining is unnecessary, whereas unions see an environment in which collective bargaining is suppressed.
Foreign-owned companies argue that a union is not needed in plants run according to Japanese-style flexible work rules and that most of their employees recognize and accept that fact. They view key elements of flexible production, especially reliance on teamwork and local-scale problem-solving, as inimical with union-imposed work rules.
At unionized motor vehicle plants, jobs were traditionally allocated to hundreds of classifications, and workers could not be moved from one classification to another without permission of the union. Jobs were assigned to individual members according to seniority. Unions defended the seniority system for allocating jobs. A 50-year-old should not be placed in a team with a 30-year-old and told to do the same job. The older worker should be assigned a less physically demanding job, and the seniority system was the way to accomplish that.
Unions have alleged that nonunion plants, especially Japaneseowned plants, have had substantially higher injury rates. U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) statistics used to support the charge have been vehemently disputed by the companies. The UAW has claimed that Honda's East Liberty, Ohio, assembly plant had annual injury rates exceeding 50 percent, a figure that Honda has denied, compared to less than 10 percent at Detroit 3 plants (Hakim 2002).
Unions and companies agree that automotive workers in union and nonunion plants alike have been prone to repetitive stress injuries, even if they disagree on the rates. The overall injury rate in the auto industry ranks third highest among all sectors, behind only shipbuilding and meatpacking. Unions argue that company treatment of injured workers varies between union and nonunion plants, and those differences ultimately contribute to the higher nonunion injury rates.
In a UAW plant, an injured worker with 10 years of service is assigned a less physically demanding job until the worker retires with maximum benefits, normally 30 years. In a flexible production plant, an injured worker can be returned to the same job that led to the repetitive stress injury in the first place. Rather than transfer to a less demanding job, a repeatedly injured worker in a nonunion plant may be offered a cash severance buy-out. An unproductive worker can thereby be removed years before the individual has qualified for the maximum pension, thus providing the company with a double financial savings.
To obtain employees capable of working under flexible work rules, factories hire people who pass through an elaborate process run by human resource specialists. Applicants are first tested for basic skills in reading, writing, arithmetic, and mechanical dexterity. Those with acceptable basic skills are placed in groups for a few hours of behavioral assessment. The groups are asked to work together to assemble a product or solve a problem. Applicants considered successful team players are interviewed to determine if they are trainable, reliable, and willing to try unfamiliar work.
Unions charge that the more elaborate hiring process under flexible production takes place at taxpayer expense. States routinely agree to do the initial screening and interviewing at their offices and to provide subsidies for training at community colleges. Unionized plants obtain new workers primarily through relatives or friends of people already work-ing there. With sharp reductions in hiring at the Detroit 3 and unionized suppliers, opportunities had been meager for children and other relatives of long-time autoworkers to gain entry to the same generous wages and benefits enjoyed by the older generation.
In a union plant, an individual who has a job-related problem first meets with the union representative. If the union official considers the complaint justified, a formal grievance is filed with the company. Thousands of grievances can pile up in a plant and take months to resolve.
In contrast, under flexible rules, a worker is expected to look for solutions through direct consultations with team and group leaders. Suggestions for changing the immediate workplace environment are encouraged, reviewed, and often adopted. When the arrangement of machines on the factory floor needs to be changed, management first asks line workers how they think things should flow. When tooling changes take too long, management asks hourly workers rather than expensive outside consultants how to fix the problem.
The UAW has viewed its failure to organize foreign-owned plants to be caused not by better plant conditions but by more effective intimidation tactics by employers. Foreign-owned carmakers vigilantly guard against unionization at their suppliers as an outer line of defense against unionization attempts inside their facilities. Unions charge that international carmakers make explicit threats to drop a supplier that lets in the union.
Unions also suggest that they are benefiting workers in nonunion plants to the extent that they get a "free ride." Workers in nonunion plants freely admit that collective bargaining agreements elsewhere in the industry positively influence their wages and benefits. Given this reality, why go to the trouble of voting in the union and paying dues? The union may be providing informal services to the roughly one-third or so in a nonunion plant who signed union cards or voted for the union in a losing election.
Organizing Parts Plants during the 1930s
The key event in the successful organizing of the motor vehicle industry is usually identified as the 1937 sit-down strike at several GM plants in Flint, Michigan, which ended with the company recognizing the UAW. The 1937 GM strikes actually represented the culmination of a campaign that began three years earlier and 100 miles south of Flint in supplier plants.
"In 1934 labor erupted," wrote labor historian Irving Bernstein. "A number of these strikes were of unusual importance . . . Four were social upheavals [including] those of auto parts workers at the Electric Auto-Lite Company in Toledo . . ." (Bernstein 1970, p. 217). Bernstein's three other three defining events were strikes by truck drivers in Minneapolis, longshoremen in San Francisco, and cotton-textile workers in New England and the South.
Auto-Lite, the linchpin
Auto-Lite, now part of Honeywell, was one of the largest independent parts suppliers at the time of the 1934 strike. The company was founded in Toledo in 1911 to produce generators that were called "Auto-liters" and were sold as a power source for electric headlamps, which were then replacing gas-fired ones.
Founder Clement O. Miniger, a native of Fostoria, Ohio, near Toledo, had been a pharmaceutical salesman and so-called drug huckster among other professions and later would be a leading Toledo banker (Bernstein 1970, p. 219). Miniger sold Auto-Lite in 1914 to a friend, John Willys, owner of Willys-Overland Co., which was producing the country's second-best-selling car brand behind Ford. Miniger returned to Auto-Lite as president in 1918 and was chairman during the 1934 strike.
Like most parts suppliers-and half of all U.S. manufacturers at the time-Auto-Lite paid workers a specified sum for each piece produced rather than according to a preset hourly rate. Workers did not object to piece rate during prosperous times because the faster they worked, and the more they produced, the more pay they took home. But if the line stopped, workers were paid nothing.
Suppliers like Auto-Lite stayed in business during the Depression by slashing the piece rate. Piece rate workers had to stay in the plant as long as 14 hours a day to take home what they could have made in a few hours before the Depression. In reaction, workers formed a union in 1933 at Auto-Lite, as well as at other large Toledo plants, including Willys and Spicer Axle (which became part of Dana).
When demands to grant union recognition, seniority privileges, and a 10 percent wage increase were rejected, a strike was called on Febru-ary 23, 1934. It ended five days later, when federal mediators convinced the employers to offer a 5 percent wage increase and to agree to "set up machinery for future negotiations . . . on all other issues." The union understood "future negotiations" to mean that a settlement would be reached by April 1 (Bernstein 1970, p. 220). When Auto-Lite again refused to negotiate, the union called a second strike for April 12. This time, only one-fourth of the workers went out on strike. The company hired strikebreakers and kept the plant open.
At this point, the Lucas County Unemployed League, an affiliate of the Marxist American Workers Party, began mass picketing of the AutoLite plant with unemployed workers. Court orders limiting the number of picketers to 25 were defied. Although Party officials were repeatedly arrested, the number of picketers grew to 10,000. Fearing he did not have enough personnel to control the crowd, the sheriff deputized special police, who were paid by Auto-Lite. One of these deputies seized an elderly man in view of many in the crowd and started hitting him. "This triggered 'the Battle of Toledo'" (Bernstein 1970, p. 222).
Fighting between the picketers and police lasted for seven hours on May 23, 1934. The Ohio National Guard arrived the next morning to evacuate 1,500 strikebreakers trapped in the factory all night. Twice the picketers charged the Guard and were repelled with bayonets and tear gas. On the third charge, the Guard opened fire, killing two and wounding 15. A final charge was repelled by more rifle fire, with two more wounded.
Prominent Ohioan Charles P. Taft, son of President William Howard Taft and brother of long-time Senator Robert A. Taft, was brought in to mediate. He ordered closure of the Auto-Lite plant pending a settlement of the dispute. Because it had recently negotiated a large contract to supply Chrysler, Auto-Lite was anxious to settle, so it agreed to negotiate directly with the union. A settlement was quickly reached, and the plant reopened June 5. The company recognized the union, rehired strikers, raised wages 5¢ per hour, and set a minimum wage of 35¢ per hour.
Organizing successes at other parts plants
The union's Auto-Lite victory in June 1934 came at a critical time for the U.S. labor movement, which was split between the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) entrenched craft-based unions and advo-cates of industry-wide unions for autoworkers and other mass production industries. The AFL chartered the United Automobile Workers of America in 1935 but permitted it to try to organize only workers on the final assembly lines, excluding parts makers and other workers at final assembly plants such as cleaners. The union was suspended a year later when members refused to accept the AFL's choice of leadership.
The unwillingness of the AFL's craft-based unions to vigorously organize unskilled mass production workers led disaffected UAW members and other unions to create the Committee of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1935. The initial purpose of the CIO was to work for AFL acceptance of industrial unionism, but when the AFL suspended the UAW and nine other unions in 1936, CIO leaders transformed the organization into an independent federation, which was renamed Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938. The CIO and AFL remained rival organizations until merging in 1955.
Unable to make inroads at the Detroit 3, the UAW turned next to organizing suppliers. Its first use of the sit-down strike came at a Bendix brake plant in South Bend, Indiana, beginning November 17, 1936. The plant was occupied by 1,500 of the 2,600 workers to forestall an attempted lockout-the company had ordered all workers to assemble outside the plant. After a nine-day strike, the company agreed to honor a contract negotiated with the union five months earlier.
The day after settling at Bendix, the UAW brought the sit-down tactic to Detroit supplier plants. First, Midland Steel's 1,200 Detroit-area production workers went on strike on November 27, 1936, to demand union recognition, a wage increase, and an end to piecework. The strike ended December 4, when Midland agreed to all demands. Six days later, 500 of Kelsey-Hayes's 5,000 workers occupied the company's Detroit factory to protest a line speedup. The company settled on December 24, offering higher wages and overtime pay, seniority protection, and a 20 percent reduction in the line's speed.
The Midland and Kelsey strikes were both settled on terms favorable to the union in large measure because of pressure on the companies from the Detroit 3. Midland was a major supplier of frames to Chrysler and Ford, and Kelsey was a major supplier of wheels and brake drums to Ford. Once their final assembly lines were forced to halt because of parts shortages, Chrysler and Ford threatened to move their business to other suppliers. The UAW's penultimate strike against GM was also aimed at parts production rather than final assembly. A sit-down strike began at GM's Fisher Body plant in Cleveland with 7,000 workers on The URW used a somewhat different form of the sit-down strike in the Akron tire plants. Hundreds of "quickie" sit-down strikes occurred in the tire plants beginning in 1934, ranging from a few minutes to a few days to protest job insecurity, lower wages, and line speedup. The URW won its first contract with one of the four major tire makers, Firestone, in 1937, after an eight-week strike. B.F. Goodrich and U.S. Rubber signed contracts in 1938 without strikes; the last of the Goodyear plants held out until 1941.
Pattern bargaining
With most automotive production workers in a union, and with most production in the hands of only three companies, the motor vehicle industry in the years after World War II adopted a distinctive form of negotiations called pattern bargaining. Pattern bargaining was instrumental in securing high wages for Detroit 3 automotive workers compared to production workers in other manufacturing sectors.
UAW contracts with the Detroit 3 expired on the same date. Shortly before the expiration, the union would select one of the companies for intense negotiations. After the union and the targeted company reached an agreement, the pattern set in that contract became the basis for negotiating with the other two carmakers. The contract covered workers in the Detroit 3 parts plants as well as final assembly plants.
The UAW selected as its target the company considered most likely to accede to the union's principal demand. In general, the UAW targeted Ford when it sought acceptance of innovative concepts, such as annual improvement factor (AIF), cost of living adjustment (COLA), and supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB). When its principal goal was a higher wage rate, the UAW targeted GM-known as "Generous Motors" in those days. Chrysler was targeted if preliminary negotiations indicated that it would balk at proposals accepted by its two larger competitors.
The UAW also targeted the company considered most vulnerable to a strike for competitive reasons. If an agreement were not reached, the union struck only that company, leaving the other two companies to continue operating at full capacity. The targeted company was pressured to settle the strike quickly because customers were buying cars from the other two companies. Instead of annual contracts, the UAW agreed to sign multiyear contracts so that the companies could plan investment and product development over several years free from the uncertainty of possible work stoppages. The typical length was three years during the second half of the twentieth century and four years into the twenty-first century.
Pattern bargaining spilled over to the other auto-related unions after World War II. The URW negotiated the same wage increase with all four major tire companies beginning in 1946, rather than continue to bargain on an individual plant and company basis. U.S. Rubber signed a master agreement that applied uniformly to all 19 of its plants in 1947, and the other three large tire makers followed suit within a year.
In 1960, when pattern bargaining was new, Detroit 3 wages were 16 percent higher than the average of all U.S. manufacturing workers, $2.63 per hour compared to $2.26. After several decades of pattern bargaining, the $25.95 average hourly rate for Detroit 3 workers in 2002 was 69 percent higher than the $15.36 average for all U.S. manufacturing workers (McAlinden 2007).
STATE OF THE UNION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With the precipitous decline in employment at the Detroit 3, the UAW has recognized that its future viability depends on organizing independent parts suppliers. A sign of its importance was the appointment for the first time of a vice president with responsibility for organizing and representing supplier plants. In the past, the UAW had allocated the assignment to lower level officials.
Subsequently the 2003 national agreement stated that the Detroit 3 would inform their suppliers of their "positive and constructive relationship" with the UAW and of their belief that all employers should respect the right of employees to seek union representation (Hudson 2003). All things being equal, the Detroit 3 would award contracts to union suppliers, but that left the UAW with the challenge of actually demonstrating that productivity in the union plant was comparable to that of a nonunion competitor. Achieving competitive productivity in a union plant inevitably meant reducing wages, reducing workforce, or reducing both.
Some Recent Organizing Successes
The UAW lacked the resources to attempt to organize several thousand parts suppliers. So it identified the group of suppliers with the brightest organizing prospects. This turned out to be Tier 1 interior parts producers.
Organizing interior suppliers
Several factors have pointed to UAW organizers toward interior suppliers. First, interior suppliers-especially final seat assemblers-have been relatively constrained by geography, specifically the need to locate immediately adjacent to final assembly plants for just-in-time delivery. Because seat suppliers must locate next door to a final assembly plant, they cannot run away from a union organizing campaign.
Second, wages in the interior sector have been near the average for all suppliers. Average hourly wages for production workers ranged from a high of $18.14 at engine parts suppliers to a low of $12.93 at stamping suppliers in 2003, a gap of 40 percent, according to the Center for Automotive Research. Between the two, workers earned an average of $14.07 at electrical parts suppliers, $14.15 at chassis parts suppliers, and $16.51 at interior parts suppliers (McAlinden 2004, p. 41). The best prospects for expanding union membership seemed to be among workers in the middle categories.
The most important reason for targeting interior suppliers was the extreme consolidation of production at three very large suppliers-JCI, Lear, and Magna-incidentally, each with very different labor relations histories. As the UAW began to target the interior sector, nearly all of Lear's production workers were union members in 2000, compared to only 2 percent at Magna and about half at JCI. The UAW was able to leverage its strong position at Lear to increase representation at JCI and Magna.
Lear's high unionization rate stemmed in part from its acquisition during the 1990s of Ford and GM seating plants that already had UAW representation. Subsequently Lear proactively decided to turn this legacy of labor relations into a strategic asset. The UAW was invited to organize Lear's nonunion plants, most notably the 5,000 production workers making headliners and instrument panels at plants acquired from UT Automotive in 1999. In part because of its employee relations, Lear was judged the most admired company in the United States in the motor vehicle parts industry in In 1995, the UAW threatened to strike Ford after it sourced seats to nonunion JCI plants in Oberlin and Plymouth. The strike against Ford was averted when JCI agreed to recognize the union in 1996 at the two plants, as well as at a third one in Strongville, Ohio, without an election, after the UAW had collected enough cards to force an election at Oberlin. Two years later the JCI plants in Oberlin and Plymouth were struck. The workers demanded wages comparable to those paid by Lear to its UAW-represented workers. The strike could have quickly brought Ford's production of the Econoline and Expedition to a standstill. In turn, JCI offered to supply Ford with seats from its nonunion plants, but Ford refused. Instead, Ford moved to obtain seats from Lear and Visteon. Ford's move forced JCI to the bargaining table, and the strike was settled on terms comparable to those at Lear.
JCI management has since reached the conclusion that antiunion activities and practices viewed as unfair by the union were not in the company's strategic interest in attracting and retaining Detroit 3 business. Consequently, in 2002 JCI gave the UAW an opportunity to organize 8,000 workers at the company's 26 plants that supplied the Detroit 3. Not all JCI plants immediately adopted more conciliatory attitudes. At three plants where the union had been recognized-Earth City, Missouri; Shreveport, Louisiana; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma-contracts were signed in 2002 only after a two-day strike.
The UAW has secured JCI's tacit agreement not to oppose organizing efforts at plants supplying the Detroit 3, and the union in turn has tacitly agreed not to attempt to organize JCI plants supplying international carmakers. Although it has consistently trailed competitor Lear in total world and North American sales, JCI has become the dominant supplier of seats to Japanese transplants in the United States, one of the few U.S.-owned suppliers to achieve such a market position.
Japanese-owned assembly plants have been eager to have nonunion seat suppliers because of close links between the two: seats are put together very close to the final assembly plant and are delivered frequently. A unionized seat plant could encourage organizing activities at other nearby suppliers, not to mention the final assembly plant itself. The ability to keep the union away from foreign-owned assembly plants is a significant component of JCI's strong market position with them.
Unions have also made progress organizing the other leading seat supplier, Magna, which had staked out an especially aggressive antiunion stance. Magna's Windsor, Ontario, seat plant, a Chrysler supplier, became the company's first plant to recognize the Canadian Auto In the United States, Magna and the UAW negotiated an arrangement similar to the one in Canada (Sherefkin and Barkholz 2007b). As Magna became Chrysler's leading seat maker and largest overall supplier, union recognition was inevitable given the attitudes of competitors Lear and JCI.
As a result of the UAW's organizing success at JCI and Magna, wages for seat production workers coalesced in the first decade of the twenty-first century at about $17 per hour, about $30 including benefits. Given the extreme demand for just-in-time delivery and sector consolidation, an orderly labor market proved especially critical in the rationalization of the interior sector of the supplier industry.
Other UAW organizing successes
Beyond seats, UAW organizing was also directed at selected chassis and powertrain suppliers. The principal successes in the first few years of the twenty-first century came at Dana and Eagle-Picher.
Toledo-based Dana, initially known as Spicer Axle, was one of the first parts suppliers to be organized during the early 1930s, along with Auto-Lite. The company was also one of the first to negotiate a master agreement with the UAW, in 1955. The UAW negotiated a neutrality letter with Dana in the late 1970s stating that the supplier would not communicate to its workers in an anti-UAW manner during organizing drives.
Nonetheless, Dana adopted aggressive antiunion policies. UAWrepresented plants were closed and new nonunion ones were built, primarily in the South. Workers were threatened with job loss, questioned about voting intentions, forced to walk past antiunion management to get to work, and prohibited from wearing prounion shirts while the company supplied opponents with antiunion ones. Dana plant managers understood that they would lose their jobs if the union got in. The UAW took Dana to arbitration five times for violating the neutrality agreement and won each time. Into the twenty-first century, only 30 of Dana's 200 U.S. facilities were unionized, only 9 by the UAW.
The turning point in relations between Dana and the UAW came at a frame plant in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, the company's largest and possibly most profitable plant. After workers rejected the union by a vote of 670 to 320 in 2002, and two earlier campaigns failed to reach the voting stage, the UAW accused Dana management of intimidation and filed grievances with the National Labor Relations Board. Cards were signed by 61 percent of Elizabethtown's production workers asking for another vote.
Stepping into the picture at this critical juncture was Elizabethtown's customer, Ford. Elizabethtown was supplying frames for the Explorer sport utility, assembled at nearby Louisville, and Ford wanted no disruption in production of what was then a very popular-and profitable-model. Around the same time Dana lost its Jeep axle contract, the historic core of its business. The loss of that business was poignant because both Dana's headquarters and the Jeep assembly plant were based in Toledo.
Dana was then also facing a hostile takeover by ArvinMeritor. In its axle business Dana's major competitor was Eaton Corp., a company with an impeccable prounion stance. All Eaton plants had been unionized between 1937 and 1941. Founder J.O. Eaton, a New Deal supporter, raised wages of all employees by between 20 and 35 percent in 1933 in the depth of the Depression. Eaton declared that the subsistence income for a family of four was $25 a week, and anyone earning less would receive the difference as a loan. Eaton reasoned that the company could borrow money but people could not. He loaned his workers $300,000, and all but $300 was ultimately repaid (Eaton Corporation 1985, p. 14).
Faced with a threat to its Detroit 3 business, Dana suddenly changed its long-standing antiunion stance in 2003. The company and union quickly struck a "partnership agreement" in which Dana agreed to stop opposing organizing efforts at its Detroit 3 supplier plants. "Good labor relations is a competitive advantage," said Dana spokesman Gary Corrigan (Butters 2004) .
Only a few hours after announcing the agreement, it was explained to workers at Elizabethtown by Dana managers and Bob King, then UAW vice president in charge of organizing suppliers. This was the first time a union official had been allowed inside the plant. Dana recognized the union at Elizabethtown on the basis of a majority of workers having already signed cards requesting an election-normally only 30 percent of workers need to sign cards to hold an election. Dana also agreed to recognize the union at other Detroit 3 supplier plants on the same basis, beginning with two plants in Virginia, Buena Vista and Bristol. The Further union election victories in 2001 came at Eagle Picher plants in Blacksburg, Virginia, and Traverse City, Michigan. Workers voted for the union in an attempt to halt erosion of wages, medical benefits, and working conditions. The Traverse City vote was especially significant because it represented the third major organizing victory in that northwestern Michigan community far from the union's core support in southeastern Michigan. The other two were a Tower Automotive plant and a Lear plant acquired from United Technologies Automotive. In addition to Traverse City, the UAW also organized a Tower plant in Clinton Township, Michigan.
A Time to Fold
Poker players know that there is a time to hold and a time to fold. For the UAW, the time to fold came early in the twenty-first century, as the carmaker-owned parts plants could not keep up with competition from independent parts producers. At the heart of the issue was the fact that the carmakers paid workers in their parts plants according to the assembly wage schedule. As the competitive position of the Detroit 3 continued to erode rather quickly in the late 1990s, issues like the uncompetitive nature of in-house parts operations came to the forefront. Continuing to pay $70 an hour in wages and benefits for work that could be done by competing unionized suppliers for $20 an hour was not sustainable.
That issue first came to a head at a former Chrysler drivetrain parts plant in New Castle, Indiana. The New Castle plant was one of the oldest in the country, having opened in 1907 as a Maxwell-Briscoe assembly plant. When Walter Chrysler acquired Maxwell-Briscoe in 1925 and renamed the company after himself, New Castle was one of six original facilities. Rather than final assembly, Chrysler used the New Castle plant to make drivetrain parts.
Metaldyne
When Chrysler put several of its parts plants up for sale, the future of the New Castle one was grim. Metaldyne agreed to purchase a 60 percent stake in the plant and to run it for one year, 2003, to see if it could be made profitable. Metaldyne was willing to keep the union in the plant but said it couldn't run it profitably unless a new labor contract was negotiated. Metaldyne has considered the New Castle plant to be a success. In the first year, sales increased from $400 million to $500 million and productivity increased 30 percent. The UAW has also considered the Metaldyne story a success, as it has signaled that it would be willing to entertain similar restructuring at other endangered parts plants.
Former Detroit 3 suppliers
Suppliers spun off by GM during the 1990s, such as American Axle, DelcoRemy, and Guide, also inherited high-wage assembly labor contracts. In 2004 the UAW and Guide agreed to a five-year contract with a two-tier wage structure of $22.95 per hour for existing workers and $12.50 for new ones (Armstrong 2004d). However, this was of little relevance in the short run because few new hires were anticipated for many years. The new contract represented the erosion of a wage structure that had become unsustainable.
A one-day strike at American Axle in February 2004 produced an agreement that permitted two-tier wages of $17 per hour for new hires and $25 for existing workers. In exchange for the two-tier wages, the company agreed not to close any plants during the four-year term of the contract. It had wanted to close a forge plant in Detroit and an axle plant in Buffalo. To gain ratification of the contract, American Axle threw in a signing bonus of $5,000 plus 2 percent of wages for each worker, as well as $1,000 annual Christmas bonuses. In 2008, the UAW struck American Axle again. This strike was over the company's intent to substantially cut wages and benefits. It severely disrupted its principal customer, GM.
By far, however, the greatest challenge that the UAW faced in salvaging former Detroit 3 parts plants came with Visteon and Delphi. When it was spun off in 1999, Delphi became the largest supplier in the United States and in the world, the largest supplier for GM, and the largest unionized supplier. Similarly, Visteon was turned into an independent company by Ford in 2000. It instantly became the secondlargest supplier in the United States and in the world, as well as Ford's largest supplier. Likewise, it also instantly became the second-largest unionized supplier. The UAW represented 50 percent of Visteon's 24,000 workers and 90 percent of Delphi's 44,000 workers, and other unions represented the rest.
However, Delphi and Visteon found themselves paying Detroit 3 wages while trying to compete for business with suppliers-unionized and nonunion-paying much lower wages. This was clearly an unsustainable position for Delphi and Visteon, and the UAW understood that. But instantly slashing wages in half to become competitive was just as untenable-even if the UAW permitted it, the company would face a crippling morale problem.
The UAW agreed to a two-tiered wage structure at Visteon, with starting wage for new hires set at $14, compared with $24 for former Ford workers.
3 Yet even a mere two-tier wage structure didn't satisfy former Ford workers, who were to be treated as indistinguishable from other Ford workers even though they were now at a parts supplier. They received Ford checks and Ford pensions, and they could exercise seniority rights to transfer to facilities still owned by Ford. The expectation was that as job openings occurred at Ford, they would be filled by Ford employees "assigned" to Visteon. Still, Visteon's high costs continued to cause "considerable tensions with Ford" (Sedgwick 2003) .
The arrangement at Ford lasted less than five years. Having lost money each year of its existence, Visteon faced bankruptcy unless drastic action was taken. As a result, half of Visteon's plants were "given" back to Ford because Visteon couldn't operate them profitably even with $15-an-hour labor. Like the children's card game old maid, Visteon hoped to survive by having Ford extract the "losers" from its hand. Visteon would drop from the second-to the ninth-largest supplier in the United States by shedding half of its business and workforce (see Chapter 2) .
The principal way to address Delphi's uncompetitive wage bill in a manner agreeable to the UAW in the short term was a sharp reduction in the size of the workforce, accelerated through buyout programs. 
OUTLOOK AND UNCERTAINTIES
The restructuring of the auto industry in the twenty-first century has made and lost the fortunes of investors and the careers of executives, but it has been the rank and file workers who have been most buffeted by the changes. Wages have been lowered, benefits slashed, job classifications eliminated, work rules modified, and jobs cut altogether.
Between 2000 and 2006, the number of production jobs in the U.S. motor vehicle industry declined from 948,000 to 751,000. Production jobs declined from 207,000 to 162,000 at assembly plants and from 741,000 to 589,000 at parts plants. The vast majority of the 197,000 production jobs lost between 2000 and 2006 were held by unionized workers. On the assembly side, the loss of 45,000 production workers masked an even larger decline in union members; employment at Detroit 3 assembly plants was reduced by more than 45,000 between assembly plants actually increased.
On the parts side, about 64,000 of the 153,000 decline in employment between 2000 and 2006 came at Delphi and Visteon, where most production workers were represented by a union. The share of unionized workers among the other 89,000 production jobs lost at parts plants between 2000 and 2006 cannot be determined from our data, but we believe it to have been a substantial percentage.
Two issues have shaped the changing labor agreements in the auto supplier sector in the early twenty-first century. By paying the relatively high levels of wages and benefits typical of assembly plants, the Detroit 3's parts operations had become woefully uncompetitive compared to their domestic competition. Furthermore, continuing erosion of the Detroit 3's market share in combination with the southern movement of assembly and parts plants has contributed to a transformation of labor relations in the U.S. auto sector.
The higher wage rates at Detroit 3 parts plants have dominated the drive for increased outsourcing to independent suppliers. Contracts negotiated in unionized supplier plants were substantially lower than those in the Detroit 3 plants. In 2002 the average hourly wage in the UAW contract with 25 suppliers covering 19,379 workers was $15.76, only 3 percent higher than the average for all U.S. manufacturing (McAlinden 2004) . Wages paid in nonunion plants have been even lower.
A key to restructuring labor relations has been the southern movement of assembly and parts plants. Auto alley has become the heart of U.S. motor vehicle production, its southern end having experienced rapid growth as most new assembly plants and parts plants have been opened there. The attraction of the South has been its nonunion environment.
As the downward spiral of market share loss and job loss ran its course, inevitably the Detroit 3 and unions have blamed each other. Companies have blamed excessive wage and benefit obligations, and unions have blamed poor management and products. Corporate executives have reassured jittery shareholders that investments would be protected, while democratically elected union leaders have reassured jittery members that jobs would be protected. Neither could deliver on their promises.
The precipitous decline in auto union representation showed no signs of slowing in the early twenty-first century. The percentage of union workers in the U.S. auto industry in the twenty-first century was the lowest since the 1930s. At the current rate of decline, in a quarter century, the union would no longer have any auto workers to represent. Reversing that trend is the main challenge of automotive unions going forward.
The UAW leadership has held many discreet meetings with the Detroit 3, parts makers, government officials, and even Toyota. Asking current members to choose between unemployment and wage cuts has been politically impossible for UAW leadership, a surefire recipe for being voted out of office. Instead, the UAW has negotiated lower wages and employment levels for the future while protecting the status of current members. When current employees retire, they are either not replaced or are replaced by new employees at lower wage rates.
In moments of detached analysis, the UAW and the Detroit 3 recognize that the survival of one depends on the survival of the other. Yet after nearly a century of bitter conflict between them, the biggest challenge facing both parties is bringing themselves to acknowledge explicitly that they must transform the existing antagonist labor-management paradigm. 4 The 2007 labor agreement between the UAW and the Detroit 3 offered promise of such a transformation. It improved the competitiveness of the Detroit 3 by establishing a lower wage structure and independent trusts to manage retiree health care liabilities. The agreement seemed based on a recognition by both the UAW and the Detroit 3 that their fates are inseparably linked (Howes 2007b; Simon 2007a).
Notes

